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There is growing concern amidst the public in general and within Congress 
about the size of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet 
Union 2nd the future of strategic arms control. Numerous localities across 
the nation have passed resolutions calling for an immediate end to the 
strategic arms race, and in favor of renewed efforts to achieve a new arms 
control agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., especially as SALT I 1  
remains on the calendar in the Senate without plans for further 
Consideration. 
Kany Members of Congress have introduced resolutions intended to achieve 
the same or similar ends, some of which have attracted significant support in 
both Houses i ~ c l u d i n g  S.Z.Res. 212, which passed the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on June 9, 1982, and H.J.Res. 521, which passed the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on June 23, i982. The full House considered H.J.Res. 521 
on Au3. 5 ,  1962, and voted not to accept the original language, which would 
have called for an immediate negotiated freeze, voting instead in favor of 
suSstitute language in favor of a freeze after the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have 
sharply reduced their strategic forces to equal levels. President Reagan had 
endorsed a proposal similar to that approved by the House as part of his call 
for reCuctions in nuclear forces. Also, on May 9 ,  1982, the President 
revealed his two-stage START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) proposal. He 
called for reductions, during the first phase, of ballistic missile warheads 
to equal levels at least one-third below current levels, with no morn than 
half of the renining warheads to be landbased. The second phase provides for 
equal ceilings on other ~ l e m e n t s ,  including ballistic missile zhrowweight. 
Heightened public and congressional concern, and the various proposals 
themselves, raise the following questions: 
-- What are the reasons for this growing concern? 
- - What effect might a freeze have on the defense 
Sudget and on the budget deficit? 
- - What are the possible effects on President 
Reagan's strategic force modernization program? 
-- What are the possible effects on the capabilities 
and survivability of U.S. strategic forces 
and on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance? 
-- Could a freeze be successfully monitored? 
- - What are the possible effects on the U.S. 
negotiating position in Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks? 
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SACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
Strategic arms control has been an ongoing process since the beginning of 
the SALT negotiations in 1969. The first fruit of these negotiations was the 
so-called SALT I agreement (1972), in reality a dual agreement consisting of: 
(a) the ABM Treaty, which, with its associated 1974 protocol limits the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. to one anti-ballistic missile system each with 100 
launchers; and (b! an Interim Agreement, which set ceilings on the aggregate 
number of I C S M  and SLBM launchers for both powers (1,710 for the United 
States; 2,348 for the Soviet Union). 
SALT I was controversial, in and of itself, in terms of the negOtiatiRg 
techniques used Sy the Nixon Administration, especially by Henry Kissinger; 
the disparity in the nnmber of launchers in favor of the Soviet Union (offset 
by a U.S. advantage in warheads because of MIRV -- Multiple Independently 
Targetable Reentry Vehicles -- technology employed by the U.S.); and 
subsequent issues surrounding Soviet compliance and U.S. verification. 
Despite these issues, both powers entered into a second phase of 
negotiations, which resulted in the SALT I1 treaty, signed in June 1979. 
Unlike its predecessor agreement, SALT I1 set ceilings on the overall 
inventory of strategic arms (2,250 launchers, which would have reduced Soviet 
launchers significantly, U.S. launchers minimally), as well as sublimits in 
specific categories of weapons -- overall numbers of launchers and MIRVed 
ballistic missiles. Also, SALT I1 included restrictions on qualitative 
improvements in strategic systems. 
Although considered Sy the Senate Foreign Relations an8 Armed Services 
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Committees, SALT I 1  became embroiled in other issues, including the presence 
of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This 
iast issue proved to be most significant, as it led Presidenf Carter to ask 
9 e  Senate to snspend consiceration of SALT 11 pending resolution of the 
Afghan situation. This suspension has continued since President Carter's 
request in January 1980. The SALT I Interim Agreement had expired before the 
negotiations for SALT I1 were complete, but the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
declared they would continue to abide by its terms. After the U.S. 
suspended consideration of SALT 11, it stated publicly that it would not take 
actions which would prejudice future compliance with SALT I1 as long as the 
Soviets exercise similar restraint. The Soviets are also reported to have 
adopted a similar position on SALT 11, although they have not made any public 
declarations concerning their compliance. 
The Reagan Administration came into office highly critical of SALT 11, and 
has not requested that the Senate resume consideration of that agreement. 
However, it has not changed U.S. policy concerning compliance with SALT 11. 
At the same time, the Administration has not resumed negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, although the President has announced a different tack, renaming 
the talks START -- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks -- thus emphasizing 
reductions rather than limitations. However, the Administration is widely 
perceived to have taken a long time to complete its preferred negotiating 
position before resuming the taiks, which the President now hopes to begin by 
the end of June. 
The Administration's delay in announcing a strategic arms csntrol proposal 
left a void that proponents of a nuclear freeze in both Congress and at the 
grassroots level sought to fill. Congressional action on the nuclear weapons 
freeze issue intensified in March 1962, with the introduction of a myriad of 
freeze-related resolutions, the most well known being S.J.Res. 163 
(Kennedy-Hatfield) and S.J.Eies. 177 (Jackson-Warner). The House counterparts 
of these resolutions are Y.J.Res. 433 (Markey) and H.Con.Res. 297 (Carney), 
respectively. 
The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calls for an immediate freeze on the 
testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery 
vehicles. The Jackson-Warner resolution calls for a freeze at "equal and 
sharply reduced levels." President Reagan has endorsed S.J.Res. 177. The 
basic difference between these two resolutions is the per.ception of the 
strategic balance they embody. Advocates of the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution 
believe there is roagh parity, therefore now is the time to initiate a 
freeze. Conversely, proponents of the Jackson-Warner approach believe the 
Soviet Union has advantages in key areas that must be rectfied before a 
freeze is enacted. In addition to these two resolutions, there are many 
resolutions which are variations on the freeze idea, resolutions which call 
for specific reductions, as well a s  resolutiocs calling for compliance with 
or ratification cf SALT 11. 
Congressional Action 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on these resolutions 
during the end of April and beginning of May, and reported out an original 
joint resolution, S.J.Res 212. This resolution commends the Reagan START 
proposal, and calls for sharp reductions to equal levels of ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
their warheads. It also calls on the U.S. to refrain from undercutting SALT 
I or 11. The new resolution passed the committee by a vote of 12-5 on June 
9, 1982. This resolution does not mention a "freezerw and has been 
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interpreted as favorable to the Adminisrration. 
In September 1982, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee issued a report on S.J.Res. 212, in which it found "that 
the proposed resolution is an unconstitutional Exercise of congressional 
power" and that it "should be rejected by the Senate." 
On June 23, 1982, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed an original 
joint resolution, H.J.Res. 521, by a vote of 28-8. This resolution urges 
that START result in a "mutual, verifiable freeze on the testing, production 
and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery 
systems," and then proceed to "substantial, equitabie and verifiable 
reductions." The resolution also states that the U.S. "shall promptly 
approve the SALT I1 agreement provided adequate verification capabilities are 
maintained." 
On Aug. 5, 1982, the House debated H.J.Res. 521. Opponents of the 
resolution offered substitute language in favor of sharp reductions in U.S. 
and Soviet strategic forces to equal levels followed by a freeze. The House 
.voted 204-202 to accept the substitute language, and then voted 175-229 not 
KO recommit the resolution to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Finally, 
the House passed H.J.Res. 521 as amended, 273-125. 
Reasons for Growing PuSiic and Congressicnal Concern 
The initial impscus for congressional nuclear weapons freeze initiatives 
has come from a grassroots movement which has grown dramatically over ths 
past several months. The main force behind this movement appears to be a 
growing realization of the dangers of nuclear war and a belief that the 
likelihood of such a war is increasing, perhaps related to the absence of 
strategic arms negotiations. 
The roots of the nuclear freeze movement in the Ucited States can be 
traced to Massachusetts, where Randall Forsberg, founder and director of the 
Institute for Defense and Disarmanent Studies, wrote a memorandum in 1980 
entitled "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," which has become the 
fundamental document of the freeze movement. The memorandum puts forth a 
freeze proposal, calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to freeze 
the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems. This has become the basis for various freeze resolutions adopted 
across the country. 
The freeze movement has spread significantly since initial referenda were 
passed in state senatorial districts in western Massachusetts in Nov. 1980. 
According to the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign's National Clearinghouse, 
organized freeze efforts are ongoing in 50 states and a majority of 
congressional districts. Numerous New England town meetings, various city 
councils and seven state legislatures have passld freeze resolutions to date. 
Freeze resolutions were on 28 State or local ballots in Nov. 1982, winning in 
25 of them. 
In addition to the general concern over the effects and likelihood of 
nuclear war, other concerns have apparently played a role in the freeze 
movement. One is the size and scope of President Reagan's defense build-up, 
which represents the largest peacetime defense increase in real terms,' and 
specifically marks funds for an array of strategic improvements or 
modernizations. Some critics find these plans incompatible with sincere arms 
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ccntrol efforts. Toncern has also been expressed by some over comments by 
nembers of the Administration about limited and survivable nuclear war. 
Finally, some concern has also focused on the size of the defense budget 
;jersus curtailed domestic programs, and also the potential relationship 
between defense spending and the large estimated Federal deficit. 
A final factor which may have influenced the U.S. movement is the recent 
wave of anti-nuclear demonstrations in Western Europe. While these 
demonstrations were largeiy against the deployment of intermediate range 
nuclear forces in Europe, the general concerns were similar, and there may 
have been some spill-over effect in the United states. 
Effects on the Defense Budget and the Budget Deficit 
As noted, concern over the size of the proposed defense budget ($258 
biilion Total Obligational Authority, $215 billion outlays for FY83, with a 
5-year projection of $1.6 trillion) and the large projected deficit are 
factors which may be prompting support for some of the freeze/moratorium 
proposals. Some proponents argue that if the strategic component of the 
defense Sudget were eliminated by a freeze this savings could be translated 
into a direct reduction of the budget deficit for FY83. The Reagan 
Administration now calculates that FY83 deficit to be around $101.9 billion; 
the CBO baseline projection is $182 billion. 
However, the FY83 request for budget authority for stratesic forces is 
$23.1 billion, of which at least $14.47 billion would be affected by a 
freeze. Thus, for F Y 8 3  the savings within the defense budget, or as a sum 
free to be applied against the deficit, wonld be significant but quite 
limited. The amount of money freed up by a freeze would be substantial over 
ths course of che entire Reagan strategic modernization program. The total 
projected cost, FY82-FY87, would be $180.2 billion (in constant FY82 
dollars), not all of which would be affected by a freeze. 
Effects on the Reagan Strategic Force Modernization Program 
On Oct. 2, 1981, President Reagan announced a program to modernize and 
upgrade U.S. strategic forces. The overall purpose of the program is to 
overcome perceived vulnerabilities and ShortcomiRgs and to improve the 
survivability of U.S. forces, thus maintaining their capability as a 
deterrent. There are five major elements to the program: manned bombers, MX 
basing, command systems (C3), submarines, and strategic defense. [Fcr more 
detail see MB 81254: The Reagan Plan for U.S. Strategic Forces: Issues for 
C0ngress.j 
Of these five elements, for at least three -- manned bombers, MX basing 
and submarines -- growth and modernization would be suspended by the 
proposals for a freeze. Some strategic defense programs involving nuclear 
weapons would also be included. President Reagan opposes the proposals for a 
freeze at current levels, arguing that this would deny the U.S. any 
opportunity to close the "window of vulnerability" (discussed in next 
section). The proposal Which the President has endorsed, H.Con.Res. 297 
(Carney), S.J.Res. 177 (Jackson-Warner), would implement a freeze only after 
mutual reduction to equal levels, allowing the U.S. to pursue these new 
strategic programs pending the outcome of negotiations. Critics note that at 
the same time the Soviet Union would also be free to continue its strategic 
arms growth, thus making reductions more difficult. However, given the 
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President's endorsement of this proposal it would appear that the freeze 
concept itself has become less of a debating issue than the sequence of 
implementation, i-e., freezing now and then seeking reductions, or freezing 
cnce reductions are achieved. 
Elements of the Reagan strategic program have also encountered opposition 
in (Congress not related to arguments on freeze proposals. On Mar. 23, 1982, 
the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear 
Forces voted 9-0 not to fund manufacture and silo deployment of the MX 
aissile until the Administration decides on a suitable basing mode. The full 
committee endorsed this position on Mar. 29, 1982. Other programs, such a s  
the B-l bomber and two Trident submarines, may also face some congressional 
opposition. 
Effects on U.S. Strategic Forces and the U.S.-Soviet Balance 
Much of the debate over the various freeze proposals centers on the 
perceived strategic vulnerability of the U.S. and the nature of the current 
strategic balance. 
The most often discussed term is the "window of vulnerability," i.e., the 
vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces based on certain Soviet strategic 
weapons capabilities. The exact meaning of this vulnerability has become 
unzertain Fn recent weeks. The usual description of the "window" is that the 
Soviet MIRVed ICBMs present the danger of a potentially successful Soviet 
first strike against U.S. ICBMs, while leaving the Soviets with a sufficient 
second strike or residual forces to deter a U.S. counterattack. Critics of 
this perception have countered that even in such ac instance the U.S. would 
have sufficient residual forces -- manned bombers and SLBMs -- that could 
retailiate against Soviet targets. Those who feel that the "window of 
vulnerability" is a credible threat respond in turn that these remaining U.S. 
fcrces do not have the accuracy of ICBMs to attack hardened military targets, 
leavlng the U.S. in the position of having to attack Soviet cities rather 
than military targets, inviting Soviet retaliation in kind. The main concern 
is perhaps less over an actual Soviet attack than that this capability could 
be translated into political leverage against the U.S. and its allies. 
Eowever, in his press conference of Mar. 31, 1982, President Reagan stated 
that the Soviet advantage lies in their ability to absorb a U.S. retaliatory 
strike and then strike at the U.S. a second time. This is a different 
formulation than the first strike concern, and has prompted criticism, even 
from some who give credence to the "window of vulnerabilityl1 hypothesis. 
There is no definitive solution to the vulnerability issue, which remains, 
in part, a perceptual argument. Furthermore, asymmetries i n  the U.S.-Soviet 
force'structure make direct comparisons difficult. In broad terms, the U.S. 
has current advantages in ICBM accuracy, potential SLBM accuracy with the 
Trident D-5 missile, and in the total number of warheads. The Soviet Union 
has an advantage in the total number of launchers, particularly ICBMs with 
Large throwweights ( e l  the amount of payload the missile can carry, roughly 
translatable into a larger number of warheads), overall throwweight 
capabilities and the related number of MIRVs per ICBM, and megatonage (total 
destructive power) in their ICBM force. The Soviets also have an advantage 
in that their force has been modernized more recently, which could be 
important in a freeze as it would mean that U.S. systems would be more 
susceptible to uncertainties brought on by aging. A freeze at current levels 
would make more permanent these relative advantages and disadvantages. Given 
the fact that each of the freeze proposals is dependent on successful 
negotiations, the chance of implementing a freeze before reductions depends 
on the willingness of both parties to accept the advantages and disadvantages 
of rhe current asymmetrical balance. Similary, a freeze after reduction 
would nave a greater chance of success if both powers were willing to accept 
first force structures of more comparable composition. 
Monitoring a Freeze 
Ac important concern in all arms control proposals is the ability of the 
partles involved to monitor compliance successfully. Monitoring is the first 
technical step in the verification process. 
Tc a certain degree verification requirements have been as much a 
determinant in the shaping of arms control agreenents as they have been 
safeguards after implementation. SALT I, and to a large extent SALT 11, set 
limits on the number of launchers rather than weapons as the de2loyment of 
launchers is more easily monitored and counted by national technical means. 
Yowever, the major freeze proposals would also include limitations on the 
production and testing of weapons as well as their deployment. This impcses 
monitoring requirements far beyond those under SALT I and 11. 
Of the three maj3r attributes being frozen, deployment is presumably the 
easiast tc monitor and adequately verify by nationai techcical means, given 
the types of ncticeable activity associated with weapons deployment. Testing 
of entire systerris (i.e., launch, separation cf RVs and their reentry), is 
alsc readily monitored. However, testing at the component level has been and 
remains a serious problem, although component testing does not allow the same 
confidence in the reliability of a weapon system to be achieved. Therefore, 
while monitoring is more difficult, the potential for a military threat 
arising from undetected component testing activity is also lessened. Some 
problems could be encountered in ambiguities between military missiles and 
missiles used fcr peaceful, i.e., scientific, purposes. 
Production, regardless of the level of reliability of the system, is also 
difficult to monitor, especially if the weapons are not moved to launch sites 
or are produced near launch'sites. This could be a potential problem with 
Soviet SS-17 and SS-18 missiles, which are "cold launchedlw i.e., in which 
the missile is fired above the silo, thus leaving the silo reusable for a new 
missile. However, the time required for a successful launch, reload and 
second launch remains in dispute. 
One suggested meafis around some of these monitoring problems has been 
on-site inspection (OSI). This concept has often been resisted by the Soviet 
Union and would need to be worked out in detail. ACDA Director Eugene Rostow 
has already expressed interest in "cooperative measuresw in connection with 
the Reagan Adnir~istration's approach to strategic arms control, which 
emphasizes reductions rath~?r than limits. Thus, it can be assumed that 
either major variant of the freeze proposals would impose new monitoring and 
verification requirements, some of which may fall short of adequacy in 
certain respects, or have, in the past at least, been unacceptable to the 
Soviet Union. 
Effects on U.S. Negotiating Position in INF and START 
The United States is already engaged in talks xith the Soviet Union on the 
reduction of intermediate range nuclear forces ( I N F )  in Europe and hopes to 
begjn START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in the summer of 1982. 
Administration officials have expressed concern thst these varicus 
rzsolutions will adversely affect these negotiations. This argument is made 
on two grounds. First, some major freeze proposals would include INF and 
strategic forces, thus combining those two talks and, according to the 
Administration, adding to tneir complexity. (Two other resolutions, H. J. 
Res. 443 (Zablocki) and S. J.Res. 171 (Percy), specifically call for the 
strategic arms and INF talks to be combined.) Second, the Administration 
argues that the proposals for a freeze first limit the flexibility of the 
U.S. position in any negotiations, in part by giving the Soviet Union an idea 
of what Congress is most likely to accept, or perhaps by encouraging the 
Soviets to appeal directly to Congress and the U.S. public during the course 
of negotiations. Administration spokesmen point out thac thare can be no 
similar pressure effectively exerted on the Soviet government. 
k third argument advanced by the Administratiop is the need to proceed 
with the strategic force program while also pursuing negotiations in order 
for the U.S. to have as strong a negotiating position as possible and to give 
the Soviets incentive to negotiate. As noted, this position has been 
attacked by advocates as fallacious, and some critics argue that building 
weapons a s  "bargaining chips" wastes resources or makes reductions more 
difficult. 
Soviet Reactions -
The Soviet Union has welcomed the rise of the nuclear weapcns freeze 
movement in the United States. Since the introduction of the 
Kennedy-Hatfield resolution in March, the Soviet press has given extensive 
coverage to the freeze Rovement. The two main themes of this coverage have 
been praise for the proponents of an immediate nuclear weapons freeze and 
criticism cf the Reagan Administration for rejecting this course. The 
Soviets cite disagreement with the Administration's "militarist" poiicies as 
the Sriving force.behind the freeze movement: "In a matter of six months 
this idea has gained immense popularity among ordinary Americans, who are 
seriously alarmed by the militarist hysteria being whipped up by the White 
House." [~zvestia,-August 24.1 The Soviet Union portrays itself as the ally 
of the movement: "the Soviet Union is in the vanguard of the peace 
movement." [ ~ z v e s t i a ,  June 10.1 
Soviet criticism of the Administration on the freeze issue was especially 
sharp after the House defeated the freeze resolution on Aug. 5. The Soviet 
news agency TASS, on Aug. 7, commented on the outcome of the vote: 
As is known, the Reagan Administration has, 
by raw political bargaining, undisguised scare 
tactics and blackmail, succeeded in getting the 
Bouse of Representatives to vote down that 
document [freeze resolution] and adopt a 
resolution in sup,port of its unconstructive 
position at the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting 
and reducing strategic arms. 
The Soviet Union has not officially endorsed any specific U.S. freeze 
resolution, but has put forth its own freeze proposal. Soviet President 
Brezhnev first announced the Soviet proposal in a May 18 speech to the 
Komsomol Congress: 
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I t  i s  . . .  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  b l o c k  a l l  
t h e  c h a n n e l s  f o r  t h e  c c n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  
a r n s  r a c e  i n  a n y  f o r m .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  n e x  t y p e s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  w e a p o n s  s h o u l d  b e  e i t h e r  
b a n n e d  o r  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  u t m o s t . . .  
We w o u l 6  b e  p r e p a r e d  t o  r e a c h  a g r e e m e n t s  t h a t  t h e  
s h y - "  b , a L ~ g i ~  a r m a m e n t s  o f  t h e  USSR a n d  t h e  U.S .  a r e  
f r o z e n  a l r e a d y  n o w ,  a s  s o o n  a s  t h e  t a l k s  [ S T A R T ]  
b e g i n .  F r o z e n  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y .  And t h a t  t h e i r  
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  u t m o s t . . .  
An Aug .  1 9  TASS r e l e a s e  s u m m a r i z e d  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  S o v i e t  s u p p o r t  o f  a  
f r e e z e :  
T h e  m u t u a l  f r e e z i n g  o f  n u c l e a r  a r s e n a l s  w o u l d  
b e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  f i r s t  s t e p  i n  s t o p p i n g  t h e  n u c l e a r  
arms r a c e .  T h i s  w o u i d  r u l e  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  b u i l d i n g  u p  o f  n u c l e a r  a r m a m e n t s  a n d  c r e a t e  
f a v o r a b l e  c o n d i t i c n s  f o r  t h e  s p e e d i e s t  a d o p t i o n  
o f  e f f e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  t o  r e d u c e  a n d  l i m i t  n u c l e a r  
arms. 
A l t h o u g h  t h e  S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l  c a l l e d  f o r  a f r e e z e  a t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  START 
t a l k s  w e r e  t o  b e g i n  ( J u n e  2 9 ) ,  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h o s e  t a i k s  h a s  n o t  h a m p e r e d  
S o v i e t  c a l l s  f o r  a f r e e z e .  T h e  S o v i e t s  a r e  s t i l l  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  R e a g a n  
r E a r m a m e n t  p r o g r a m  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  s t i l l  s e e k i n g  " a  f r e e z e  o n  n u c l e a r  
w e a p o n s  w h i l e  t h e  t a l k s  a r e  i n  p r o g r e s s . "  [ M o s c o w  W o r l d  S e r v i c e ,  J u l y  1, 
1 9 8 2 .  ] 
LEGISLATION 
H . J . R e s .  5 2 1  ( Z a b l o c k i  e t  a l . )  
S t a t e s  t h a t  START s h o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  a " m u t u a l  v e r i f i a b l e  f r e e z e w  o n  
t e s t i n g ,  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  d e p l o y m e n t ,  f o l l o w e d  b y  " s u b s t a n t i a l ,  e q u i t a b l e  a n d  
v e r i f i a b l e  r e d u c t i o n s , "  a n d  t h a t  t h e  U.S.  a p p r o v e  SALT 11. An o r i g i n a l  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  p a s s e d  b y  t h e  H o u s e  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  Committee, 2 8 - 8 ,  J u n e  2 3 ,  
1 9 8 2 ,  a n d  r e p o r t e d  J u l y  1 9 ,  1 9 8 2  ( H . R e p t .  9 7 - 4 9 3 ) .  Amendecl s o  a s  t o  f a v o r  
s h a r p  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  U . S .  a n d  S o v i e t  f o r c e s  t o  e q u a l  l e v e l s  f o l l o w e d  b y  a 
f r e e z e ,  2 0 4 - 2 0 2 ;  a n d  t h e n  p a s s e d ,  2 7 3 - 1 2 5 ,  A u g .  5 ,  1 9 8 2 .  
S .  J. R e s .  2 1 2  ( P e r c y )  
Commends P r e s i d e n t  R e a g a n ' s  START p r o p o s a l ,  a n d  s t a t e s  t h a t  a n e w  arms 
c o n t r o l  a g r e e m e n t  s h o u l d  " s h a r p l y  r e d u c e w  n u m b e r s  o f  m i s s i l e s  a n d  w a r h e a d s ;  
t h a t  U . S .  s h o l i l d  n o t  u n d e r c u t  SALT I a n d  1 1 ;  a n d  s u g g e s t s  m u t u a l  c o n f i d e n c e  
b u i l d i n g  m e a s u r e s .  An o r i g i n a l  r e s o l u t i o n ,  p a s s e d  b y  t h e  S e n a t e  F o r e i g n  
R e l a t i o n s  C o m m i t t e e ,  1 2 - 5 ,  J u n e  9 ,  1 9 8 2 ,  a n d  r e p o r t e d  J u l y  1 2 ,  1 9 8 2  ( S . R e p t .  
9 7 - 4 8 3 ) .  
( O n l y  t h o s e  D i l l s  o n  w h i c h  s o m e  a c t i o n  h a s  b e e n  t a k e n  a r e  n o t e d  h e r e .  S e e  
p r i n t e d  A p p e n d i x  f o r  a t a b u l - a r  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  l e g i s l a t i v e  
p r o p o s a l s . )  
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
11/02/82 -- Freeze resolutions won in 25 out of 28 jurisdictions 
where they appearea cn ballots. 
09/22/82 -- Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation 
of Powers issuer2 a report finding S.J.Res. 212 to be 
unconstitutional and recommending it not be passed by 
the Senate. 
08/05/82 -- House voted 204-202 to amend H.J.Res. 521 in favor 
of sharp reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces 
followed by a freeze, and then voted to pass the 
amended resolution, 273-125. 
06/23/82 -- House Foreign Affairs Committee approved, 28-8, H.J.Res. 
521, calling for a "mutual verifiable, ... substantial, 
equitable and verifiable reductions," and approval of 
SALT I1 by the United States. 
05/09/82 -- T h e  Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported 
out an original joint reaolution, by a vote of 
12-5, commending President Reagan's START proposal, 
calling for reductions to equal levels of missiles 
and warheads, and asking the U.S. not to undercut 
SALT I and 11. The resolution does not mention a 
"freeze. " 
05/13/82 -- President Reagan said the United States would not 
undercut "existing strategic arms agreements" as 
long as the Scviet Union did the same. 
35/18/82 -- Soviet Fresident Brezhnev responded to President 
Fieaganps START proposal by welcoming the desire 
to negotiate but criticizing the spscifics of the 
proposal. Brezhnev proposed a U.S.-Soviet 
freeze on strategic weapons to fake effect 
"as soon as the talks [START] begin." 
05/05/82 -- President Reagan proposed a two-step 
reduction of strategic nuclear forces: 
(1) reductions of ballistic missile warheads to 
equal levels, with no more than half of the 
remaiRing warheads to be land based; (2) equal 
ceiling on other elements, including ballistic 
missile throwweight. 
03/31/52 -- President Reagan called for reductions in 
~ u c l e a r  arms and endbrsed the 
Jackson-Warner-Carney freeze proposal. 
03/16/82 -- President Brezhnev offered a moratorium 
on deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear 
missiles in the European part of the Soviet 
Union. 
11/18/81 -- President Reagan announced his ,"zero-option,'' 
calling for the elimination of all 
intermediate-range nuclear forces from 
Europe. 
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below current 
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